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A MESSAGE FROM SILICON VALLEY COMMUNITY FOUNDATION  
 
 
At a time when more individuals and families began to lose their homes or jobs, Silicon Valley 
Community Foundation determined that building economic security would fulfill a critical need 
for many residents in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties. 
 
We knew that those caught in the foreclosure crisis needed housing counseling and legal help. 
We knew that supporting financial education and asset building would help low-wage earners 
create a better future. And we had anecdotal information that those who lacked access to 
traditional banking and lending services had few choices but to turn to payday lenders who 
charge interest rates that can be as high as 400 percent. 
 
To better inform our understanding of how these practices came about, and to have factual and 
documented information upon which to act, we asked the Public Interest Law Firm to research 
the history of payday lending and the existing laws and regulations governing the industry. The 
resulting report provides a thorough analysis of current policies and proposals and suggests steps 
for policy makers, funders and others interested in curbing these abusive lending practices.  
 
What they found surprised and shocked us. It also helped us to see how payday lending in its 
current form contributes to creating a growing circle of debt that is difficult for people to escape.  
 
We hope this report will raise awareness and build understanding about the negative impact of 
payday lending on our communities. We also hope it will prompt interest in public policies to 
restrict excessive interest and service fees.  
 
The corrosive effects of predatory lending are hurting families and communities in our region. At 
Silicon Valley Community Foundation, we look forward to building partnerships with 
government, banking and financial institutions, and nonprofit organizations who want to change 
that. 
 
 
 
Emmett D. Carson, Ph.D. 
CEO and President 
Silicon Valley Community Foundation 
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Executive Summary 
 
Payday lending, the practice by which a lender makes a relatively small, short-term loan 
to a borrower, using a post-dated check as security, drains wealth from low-income communities 
and communities of color. 
 
• Payday lending began in California in the 1990’s as an extension of the check cashing 
industry. 
• The usual repayment period for a payday loan is two weeks.  At the end of that term, the 
entire loan amount plus the finance charge must be paid in full. 
• Because payday lenders charge extremely high interest rates—an average of 400 % on a 
two-week loan—the typical borrower in California pays $800 for a $300 loan.  
• Payday lenders are disproportionately concentrated in predominately African American 
and Latino neighborhoods.  They are also more prevalent in communities where low- and 
very low-income families live. 
• In California, nearly half of borrowers take out payday loans at least once a month, and 
more than one third have taken out loans from multiple payday lenders simultaneously. 
 
While state and federal laws impose some restrictions on payday lending practices, 
payday lenders are currently largely unregulated.  Because a nationwide lending cap does not 
appear to be imminent, we believe: 
 
• State and local policy changes should be considered; 
• Access to credit and banking resources and non-predatory alternatives should be 
increased; and 
• Consumers should be educated about payday lending and its consequences. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this report is to provide an update to policymakers and stakeholders 
interested in consumer protection in California — both on a state and local level — regarding the 
status of the payday lending laws and practices in the state.   
 
Payday loans are lending transactions in which a borrower provides a lender with a post-
dated check and receives immediate cash from the lender.  The borrower’s check includes not 
only the principal loan amount, but also any interest and fees charged by the lender.  The lender 
then cashes the borrower’s check on the borrower’s next payday.  Payday loans, sometimes 
called deferred deposit transactions or cash advances, comprise one corner of a larger universe of 
“alternative financial services,” which also include check cashing services, pawn brokers, and 
rent-to-own stores.1  In California, these loans are typically small — between $100 and $300 — 
and are capped at $300.2  According to Consumers Union, the “fees for payday loans are 
extremely high: up to $17.50 for every $100 borrowed.”3  The average annual percentage rate 
(APR) in 2006 for such loans was a staggering 429%, according to the California Department of 
Corporations.4  All of this means that the cost of these small loans quickly balloons to a 
staggering amount.5   
 
By surveying the many research studies and reports that have been published in recent 
years addressing payday lending, this report:  1) examines the negative effects of payday lending 
on individuals; 2) discusses the unfortunate reality that many low-income families use check-
cashing and payday lending outlets as their primary means of financial management because 
their neighborhoods have inadequate banking choices but high concentrations of these outlets; 3) 
summarizes efforts in California, in other states, federally, and, most recently, locally, to address 
and try to prevent these negative effects by regulating the industry; and 4) provides 
recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders about the potential policy changes that 
could alleviate this problem as well as barriers to accomplishing these changes. 
 
The Predatory Nature of Payday Lending in California 
 
Store-front Payday Lending 
 
 Payday lending is widespread in California.  In 2006, approximately 1 million 
Californians were issued payday loans (at an average of 10 loans per borrower).6  The 
Department of Corporations estimated that there were approximately 2,500 payday lending 
stores by the end of 2006.7 
 
 Not surprisingly, representatives of the payday lending industry contend that they offer a 
useful product that responds to consumer demand for this type of loan.  The industry’s national 
association, the Community Financial Services Association of America, portrays a payday loan 
as a convenient and beneficial product if it is used for short-term needs, saying: 
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A payday advance is a small, unsecured, short-term loan that is usually 
repaid on the borrower’s next payday. Typically, a customer uses a payday 
advance to cover small, unexpected, expenses between paydays to avoid 
expensive bounced-check fees, late bill payment penalties, and other less 
desirable short-term credit options. . . . 
The payday advance application process is fast and simple. It usually 
requires only a few supporting documents, including proof of a regular 
income, a personal checking account and identification.8 
According to the California Department of Corporations, payday loans have some positive 
aspects: 
 
Payday loans provide an immediate source of short-term credit to meet 
emergency cash needs of consumers that may not have access to 
traditional sources of credit or elect not to use other sources of credit 
available to them.  Payday loan stores are located in close proximity to the 
customers.  Many times, the transaction can be completed in 15 minutes or 
less.  Payday lenders rarely perform time-consuming credit checks or 
evaluate the borrower’s ability to repay the loan on the due date.  Instead, 
the borrowers are required to provide information easily available to them, 
such as identification, proof of residence, recent pay stub and checking 
account information.9 
 
Consumer advocates acknowledge that payday loans are easy to obtain and that, by obtaining 
such a loan, some borrowers can avoid the damage to their credit scores that a delinquent 
payment to, say, a credit card can cause.10  However, payday loans, as they are currently 
structured and permitted in California, harm families and certain fragile communities in ways 
that outweigh the benefits of the product.   
 
 First, payday loans are exceedingly expensive.  In California, a 14-day loan has an 
average annual percentage rate of more than 400%.11  According to a 2008 issue brief by the 
Center for Responsible Lending, the typical payday loan borrower ultimately has to pay $800 for 
a $300 loan.12  The Center for American Progress explains that these loans are so costly because: 
 
. . . many borrowers are unable to pay off their loan plus lender fees in full 
when they are due and still have enough money left to cover their 
expenses until their next payday.  This means they begin a cycle of 
borrowing . . . that lasts much longer and costs much more than they had 
originally anticipated.13 
 
Payday lending costs Californians an estimated $757 million annually in finance charges.14 
 
 Moreover, payday loans encourage those who are already struggling to make ends meet 
to further compromise their financial health.  As the California Budget Project has stated, 
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“Payday loans encourage chronic borrowing.”15  Payday loans carry a very short repayment 
term, usually only until the next payday — or about two weeks — at which point the full amount 
of the loan and the finance charge must be paid at once.16  Since most borrowers take out payday 
loans to cover a chronic shortage of income over expenses, rather than to cover emergencies,17 
many cash-strapped borrowers experience another shortfall after their first loan.  That shortfall is 
compounded by the finance charge.  Payday lenders do not determine the ability of borrowers to 
repay the balloon payment that becomes due on their next payday.  Although “roll-over” loans 
— where a borrower can renew the loan and pay another fee — are prohibited in California, 
neither taking out “back-to-back” loans nor taking out payday loans from multiple sources is 
prohibited.  As a result, nearly half of California borrowers take out payday loans at least once a 
month and more than one third of borrowers have taken out loans from multiple payday lending 
companies at the same time.18   
 
 The profoundly negative consequences of borrowers’ reliance on payday loans are well 
documented.  A March 2009 letter from the National Consumer Law Center to the Chairman of 
the National Credit Union Administration provided a short summary of recent research-based 
findings about the downstream harms of payday lending.  For example, researchers recently 
showed that payday borrowers are twice as likely to file for bankruptcy in the two years after 
first getting a payday loan as applicants whose applications for a payday loan are rejected.19  
These findings “are consistent with the interpretation that payday loans and interest payments on 
them might be sufficient to tip the balance into bankruptcy for a population that is already 
severely financially stressed.”20  Other researchers have found that the use of payday loans 
increases the incidence of involuntary closure of bank accounts.21  Still others determined that 
consumers who use payday loans encounter more hardship and have trouble paying other bills, 
getting health care, and staying in their home or apartment.22 
 
According to an FDIC press release in 2005: 
 
When used frequently or for long periods, the costs [of a payday loan] can 
rapidly exceed the amount borrowed and can create a serious hardship for 
the borrower.  The FDIC believes that providing high-cost, short-term 
credit on a recurring basis to customers with long-term credit needs is not 
responsible lending.23  
 
While these negative consequences are harmful to all sectors of society, they are even more 
troubling because they disproportionately affect already vulnerable and disadvantaged families 
and communities.  In two separate reports issued in March 2009, the Center for American 
Progress and the Center for Responsible Lending identified common characteristics of payday 
borrowers.  Up until the issuance of these reports, the understanding that payday borrowers 
tended to be low income was based largely on anecdotal information.24  The Center for American 
Progress’ report “Who Borrows from Payday Lenders? An Analysis of Newly Available Data,” 
analyzes recently released data from the Federal Reserve Board and confirms that payday 
borrowers tend to have less income, lower wealth, fewer assets, and less debt than families 
without payday loans.25  The report made these additional findings: 
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• “Families who borrowed from a payday lender in the past year were more 
likely to be minorities and single women than their counterparts. They also 
tended to be younger and had less educational attainment.” 
• “Approximately 4 out of 10 families who borrowed from a payday lender 
within the past year owned their own home, while nearly 7 out of 10 families 
who had not taken out a payday loan were homeowners.” 
•  “Roughly one-quarter of families who had borrowed from a payday lender 
within the past year identified themselves as savers, compared to nearly half 
of families who did not withdraw a payday loan.” 
• “Payday loans are taken out primarily for convenience, to cover an 
emergency, and to pay for basic consumption needs, such as gas and food.”26 
The California Budget Project recently produced maps of payday lender locations for 
each of California’s legislative districts.  The maps set out a vivid portrait of California’s two-tier 
finance system by clearly demonstrating that, while high-income communities in California 
house very few payday lenders, low-income communities attract them.  In Santa Clara County, 
for example, Assembly Member Ira Ruskin’s District 21 is categorized almost entirely as “high 
income” or “moderate income” territory and houses only 4 payday lenders.27  Assembly Member 
Jim Beall’s District 24, however, has several “low” and “very low” income areas and is home to 
25 payday lenders.28   
In addition to income, studies have shown that race plays a strong and disturbing role in 
the location of payday lending.  A new analysis by the Center for Responsible Lending finds that 
California’s payday lenders are overwhelmingly located in African American and Latino 
neighborhoods, even after controlling factors such as household income.29  Strikingly, Center for 
Responsible Lending found that the racial and ethnic composition of a particular neighborhood is 
actually the primary predictor of payday lending locations.30  African Americans and Latinos 
make up a disproportionate share of payday loan borrowers in California.31  The Center’s 
specific findings include: 
• “Payday lenders are nearly eight times as concentrated in neighborhoods with 
the largest shares of African Americans and Latinos as compared to white 
neighborhoods, draining nearly $247 million in fees per year from these 
communities.”32   
• “Even after controlling for income and a variety of other factors, payday 
lenders are 2.4 times more concentrated in African American and Latino 
communities. On average, controlling for a variety of relevant factors, the 
nearest payday lender is almost twice as close to the center of an African 
American or Latino neighborhood as a largely white neighborhood.”33  
• “Race and ethnicity play a far less prominent role in the location of 
mainstream financial institutions, such as bank branches. While race and 
ethnicity account for over half of the variation in payday lender location 
explained by neighborhood factors, they explain only one percent of the 
variation in bank branch locations.”34 
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Payday lending should also be considered in context with the pricing of other household 
amenities and financial products in lower-income and minority neighborhoods.  In its 2006 
report “From Poverty, Opportunity: Putting the Market to Work for Lower Income Families,” the 
Brookings Institution found that lower-income families pay higher prices for a wide array of 
basic household necessities and financial products — including short-term credit — than higher 
income households do for the same or similar products.35  According to the Brookings 
Institution’s survey and findings, high-priced alternative financial services, such as payday 
lenders, check cashers, and pawnshops, tend to be more densely concentrated in lower-income 
areas.36 The report pointed to 1) lack of banks and credit unions in lower-income neighborhoods; 
2) unscrupulous business practices and the failure of states to regulate the “astronomical rates” of 
these products; and 3) consumer misinformation as the factors that cause lower-income 
customers to buy such high-priced products.37   
 
The macroeconomic harm of the clustering of payday lending in lower-income and 
minority communities is clear.  Payday lending has drained an estimated $247 million in fees 
from African American and Latino households in California.38  As the Center for Responsible 
Lending points out, “[t]he funds drained from these communities by payday lending could be 
saved or better spent on food, car repairs, medicine, housing, child care, education or other 
needs.”39 
 
Internet Payday Lending 
 
Payday lending has expanded from check cashing outlets, pawn shops and payday loan 
outlets to the Internet.  In fact, one estimate pegs the volume of online lending in 2008 at $7.1 
billion, almost 20 percent of the volume of traditional outlets.40  Taking out a payday loan over 
the Internet exposes borrowers to all the same predatory practices they would face if they took 
out a payday loan from a traditional store-front lender.  In addition, these borrowers are even 
more at risk of harm due to the ever-changing and largely unregulated nature of the Internet 
itself.  Even a lobbyist for the payday industry referred to Internet payday lending as “the Wild 
West.”41 
 
No single federal law addresses the practice of Internet payday lending, creating a 
sizeable hole in the regulation of such loans.  As the Consumer Federation of America points out, 
the lack of any federal law governing Internet payday lending exposes borrowers of Internet 
payday loans to greater risk.42  However, several states have created laws to address the practice; 
some have limited or barred Internet payday lending, while others have allowed it to take place 
with few restrictions.43  The regulatory inconsistencies created by the differing state laws have 
allowed Internet payday lenders to thwart state efforts to regulate their practices by registering in 
the states with few or no restrictions and selling their product to people throughout the country, 
regardless of the protections in place in the state in which the borrower resides.44   
 
Some Internet payday lenders even operate without any state licensure or by basing the 
company outside of the United States.  In California, Internet payday lending operations have 
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been able to thwart state laws regulating in-state payday lenders by claiming to be owned by 
Indian tribes in Oklahoma or Nebraska and thus not subject to state law.45  Unfortunately, even 
after years of efforts by the California Department of Corporations, these online-only lenders 
continue to operate under loose federal law, leaving consumers without state-law protections.46 
 
Further, Internet payday lenders may claim to be licensed, but offer no proof of licensure 
on the site to allow consumers the assurance that they are dealing with a legitimate vendor.  
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any consistent oversight or regulation of websites that 
claim to be licensed.  To complicate matters even further, many Internet payday lenders are 
licensed under one business name, but operate under a different domain name.47  This practice, 
combined with the series of referral sites that a borrower may click through before actually 
taking out a loan, creates confusion as to who the lender is and, therefore, who borrowers should 
contact with complaints or requests for changes to their loans.48 
 
The process of taking out an Internet payday loan is fairly simple.  According to the 
Consumer Federation of America: 
 
The typical Internet payday loan involves an online or faxed application in 
which the borrower provides extensive personal and financial information, 
direct deposit of the loan proceeds into the borrower’s bank account 
through the Automated Clearing House system on the same or next day, 
and an agreement to permit the payday lender to withdraw the loan and 
finance charge electronically from the consumer’s bank account on his/her 
next payday.49 
 
Unfortunately, this process exposes borrowers to many additional risks that they would not 
encounter at a traditional payday loan store.  For example, because borrowers submit 
applications for payday loans online, their personal financial information is vulnerable to identity 
theft and other Internet scams.50  Claims that a site is secure and private may be false, and 
borrowers do not have a way of verifying that a site is secure.51 
 
In addition to increased security risks, Internet payday lenders may not properly disclose 
the finance charges associated with taking out one of their loans.  While the Federal Truth in 
Lending Act requires lenders to post the annual percentage rate (APR) for loans offered through 
their websites, Internet payday lenders do not always comply.52  Consequently, many borrowers 
have no idea that their payday loan may carry an APR over 500%, as is frequently the case with 
such loans.  In addition to the interest and finance charge on Internet payday loan, borrowers are 
charged overdraft fees, also known as NSF fees, if the funds are not available in their checking 
account when the borrower’s account is debited on payday.53  These fees vary greatly and are 
often not disclosed by the lenders.54   
 
Finally, Internet payday borrowers can more easily be trapped in the cycle of debt that is 
a feature of all payday loans than those who use more traditional means to take out loans.55  
Some Internet payday lenders create loan agreements that are automatically set to refinance the 
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loan at the end of the loan period; these loans will do so unless the borrower reads the fine print 
and changes the setting. 56  Borrowers may not notice this detail until their loan is rolled over and 
they have incurred the additional finance fees. 
 
Why Borrowers Obtain Payday Loans 
 
With such well documented, negative impacts, a natural question is why people utilize 
such expensive, problematic products in the first place.  According to the Center for American 
Progress, people take out payday loans for three main reasons:  convenience, emergency 
expenses, and to cover basic consumption needs.57  The Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of 
Consumer Finances found that 34% of payday loan borrowers chose a payday loan for “the 
convenience factor.”58  In a survey of payday customers in California, the main reason the 
customer chose a particular payday lending outlet was because the customer “saw a payday 
location and went in.”59  Most borrowers take out payday loans to cover regular bills or 
groceries.60  Contrary to the assertions of the payday lending industry, only 10.3% of borrowers 
obtained such loans for an emergency.61 
 
The greatest market for payday loans appears to be prior borrowers who are unable to pay 
off their previous loans.  One study found that 90% of payday lenders’ business is generated by 
individuals who take out at least five loans per year; 60% of their business comes from 
borrowers averaging at least one payday loan per month.62  Despite payday lending industry 
claims that the product they offer is meant to be a last resort in times of emergency, the reality is 
that low-income borrowers obtain these loans repeatedly to cover both their basic needs and the 
increasing debt created by their prior payday loans. 
 
Payday loans are prevalent in low-income communities largely because these 
communities tend to have fewer affordable credit options than do their wealthier counterparts.63  
In unbanked or under-banked communities, individuals may not be aware that more affordable 
loan products are available and, in turn, may not realize the relative costs of payday loans in 
comparison.64  For individuals who lack experience with banks or who have bad credit, the time-
consuming and complex process of applying for more mainstream forms of credit can be 
daunting.65  This discomfort, compared with the prospect of getting a fast loan in a convenient 
location, often steers individuals who might qualify for more affordable financing into expensive 
payday loans.66  Even low-income individuals who do use mainstream banks may obtain payday 
loans because their banks do not offer smaller, short-term loan products or because the process of 
obtaining such products is too cumbersome.67   
 
Additionally, many low-income individuals obtain payday loans as a response to variable 
or unreliable earnings.  Unlike the predictable salaried employment held by many upper- or 
middle-class individuals, low-wage jobs often vary in income from week to week or month to 
month.68  Low-wage jobs also carry with them a greater risk of outright job loss than do their 
higher paid counterparts, increasing the likelihood that low-income, less educated individuals 
will find themselves suddenly unemployed.69  This income instability, coupled with a greater 
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likelihood of instability in residence and family composition, exacerbates the financial 
challenges facing low-income households.70  As such, low-income households are unlikely to 
have savings to tide them over during times of job loss or wage reduction, forcing them to turn to 
payday loans and similar products to cover their basic necessities. 
 
Finally, language or cultural issues may also contribute to low-income households 
obtaining payday loans as opposed to other types of loan products.71  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that, relative to the general population, immigrants often assume that they will not be 
able to obtain loans.  This misimpression, in turn, makes it less likely that they will apply for a 
bank account and begin to establish a credit history, which is the key to obtaining mainstream 
credit.72  Having limited proficiency in English may also increase borrowers’ reluctance to use 
mainstream banks, making them more likely to use payday loans and other alternative sources of 
financing; these language barriers may also prevent borrowers from understanding the terms of 
the loans they obtain.73  And banks in many immigrants’ home countries are not always 
trustworthy places for low-income people to put their money (shown by, for example, Mexico’s 
1990s bank crisis), making it still less likely for them to access the mainstream financial 
system.74 
 
California Legislative Responses to Payday Lending 
 
Given these profoundly negative consequences of payday loans and the well-documented 
disparate impact of those consequences on low-income and minority communities, it is not 
surprising that the state of California has taken steps to address its pernicious effects.  However, 
as discussed below, these efforts have not significantly reformed the problematic practices of 
payday lenders; indeed, California is regarded by national advocates as significantly failing to 
enact meaningful consumer protections.  
 
Payday lending began in California in the 1990s as an extension of the burgeoning check 
cashing industry.75  Because payday lending was a new practice, California law did not govern 
the practice of payday lending specifically.  Indeed, the check cashers who offered payday loans 
argued that they were not subject to the California Finance Lenders Law because they were 
merely deferring deposit of a check, not making a loan.76  
 
The lenders law strictly regulates the interest rate that consumer finance lenders may 
charge for installment loans under $2,500.77  The interest rate limits provided by that law are:  
2.5% per month on amounts up to $224; 2% per month on amounts between $226 and $900; 
1.5% per month on amounts between $901 and $1650; and 1% per month on amounts between 
$1651 and $2500.78 
 
Senate Bill 1959 (Calderon) 
 
 As a result of the lobbying efforts of the check cashing industry, California resolved the 
ambiguity surrounding the lenders law’s applicability to payday loans in the industry’s favor, 
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becoming one of 35 states that specifically permit payday lending.  In 1996, the California 
Legislature passed SB 1959 (Calderon), which essentially exempted payday lenders from the 
lenders law.79  The assumption that “many individuals face an occasional emergency [need] for 
small amounts of money for a short term” was used as justification for the passage of this bill.80 
 
However, SB 1959 did establish limited restrictions on payday lending, including a $300 
limits on the loan amount and 15% limit on fees as well as procedural protections for 
borrowers.81 
 
California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law 
 
 After these products became legal in 1997 under SB 1959, the industry boomed: by 2002, 
some estimates were that over one million deferred deposit transactions per month were 
completed in California.82  However, with this growth came controversy.  As noted by the 
Legislature, numerous consumer groups “have long argued that deferred deposits involve 
excessive charges and fees and too often exacerbate the debt treadmill or ‘cycle of debt’ 
confronting many consumers who use deferred deposits.”83 
 
 These concerns led to the passage of the California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law, 
which became effective in 2003.  This statute is currently the primary law governing the practice 
of payday lending in California.84   
 
 Passage of the statute (introduced as SB 898 [Perata]) was tremendously hard-fought and 
contentious as consumer advocates and payday lending industry lobbyists battled over the terms 
of the bill.  This description of the debate was supplied in the Senate Floor Analysis: 
 
Following the [Assembly Business and Professions] committee’s 
informational hearing, the committee chair initiated negotiations with all 
stakeholders, including representatives of the author’s office, consumer 
groups, deferred deposit businesses, regulatory agencies, and committee 
staff.  These complex negotiations have been underway for approximately 
eight months; the result is the current version of this bill.  All parties 
involved in the negotiations made serious and good faith efforts to resolve 
issues, and there were significant concessions.85 
 
 The statute established both licensure and regulation of persons making deferred deposit 
transactions (“licensees”).86  The licensure provisions are rather extensive, requiring, among 
other things:  applications for licensure; surety bonds; submission and maintenance of financial 
records and statements; fingerprinting of customers and key personnel; fees and assessments for 
applications, licensure, and administration of oversight; records examination and net worth 
requirements; advertisement disclosures; and posting of fee information.87  The statute also 
established oversight by the Department of Corporations persons engaged in the business of 
making deferred deposit transactions.88 
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 The regulatory features of the statute, however, are not significantly broader than those 
established by SB 1959.  The law made changes to the existing regulatory requirements, 
including requiring that licensees inform borrowers regarding charges and fees, of the fact that 
the borrower cannot be prosecuted for returned check in connection with the transaction, and of 
the prohibition against licensees’ demanding collateral. 89  The law also requires licensees to 
provide borrowers with the Department of Corporations’ toll-free number.90  In addition, the law 
allows licensees to defer the deposit of a customer’s personal check for up to 31 days (rather than 
30 days as previously allowed),91 and allows them to extend the repayment period or to create a 
payment plan, so long as additional fees are not charged.92  The law does not, however, limit the 
number of payday loans a payday lender may make to a borrower in any given period of time.93 
 
 During the negotiations concerning SB 898, the payday lending/check cashing industry 
representatives were quick to point out that the new law would subject deferred deposit 
businesses “to substantially higher charges and fees compared to the [then-] current annual $50 
fee.”94  As explained in the Senate Floor Analysis: 
 
These new charges and fees include an initial non-refundable fee of $100 
for investigating the application, plus $200 as an application fee, plus the 
cost of fingerprint processing, plus an annual assessment, as determined 
by the Department of Corporations, of the pro rata share of all costs and 
expenses reasonably incurred in the administration of the provisions of 
this bill, plus the costs of being periodically audited by DOC.95 
 
These concessions by the industry were cited—juxtaposed with concessions by consumer 
advocates regarding fees and installment plans—as evidence that this bill embodied a 
compromise that all parties could live with.  But, as set out below, this compromise has 
not fulfilled its promise. 
Efforts to Reform Payday Lending in California 
Unfortunately, despite the tremendous efforts put into reaching the compromises 
embodied in the California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law, it has fallen short as a consumer 
protection measure.  For one thing, it leaves California significantly behind some states’ 
protections against some of the worst aspects of payday loans.  Other states respond to payday 
lending in one of three ways:   
• “[Enforcing] an interest rate cap at or around 36% on small loans, inclusive of payday 
lending;”96 
• “[Allowing] payday lenders to charge interest rates in the hundreds of percent while 
making some restrictions on lending practices and licensure requirements;”97 or 
• “[Allowing] payday lenders to operate with virtually no legal restrictions.” 98  
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As of the March 2009, fifteen states and the District of Columbia require payday lenders to 
comply with an annual interest rate cap of 36%.99  If Arizona’s exclusion for payday lenders 
from its 36% cap expires in 2010, it will be the sixteenth state to adopt a rate cap. 
California falls in the third category of largely ineffectual regulation on the margins.  
Three consumer advocacy organizations recently graded California an “F” in their “Small Dollar 
Loan Product Scorecard,” based on, among other things, the staggering 460% APR allowed 
under California law on 2-week payday loans.100  In contrast, in recent years, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon have passed usury caps or 
prohibitions on payday loans.   
And the Department of Corporations’ reports on the statute’s performance make clear 
that at least one of the most pernicious aspects of payday loans — that they trap repeat borrowers 
in a lengthy cycle of debt — is still very much a feature of these products.101  The Department of 
Corporations found that repeat borrowers make up 73% of payday borrowers statewide.102 
California legislators have introduced several bills that would have increased regulation 
of and limits on deferred deposit transactions and/or the payday lending industry.  However, 
despite these attempts, and despite pressure from consumer advocacy organizations for 
California — and other states — to adopt a “Model Deferred Deposit Loan Act,”103 most of the 
legislation has stalled or failed, as detailed below.    
Changes to California payday lending law since the passage of the California Deferred 
Deposit Transaction Law include increasing regulators’ reporting requirements regarding 
advertising,104 requiring payday lenders to comply with federal law regarding loans to military 
personnel,105 and exempting auto dealers from coverage.106  
 
Proposed changes that failed include efforts to limit APR to 36%,107 to lower the fee 
cap,108 to ease the burden of payday lenders’ collection practices on military personnel beyond 
federal requirements,109 and to require regulators to create a comprehensive report on the demand 
for payday lending.110  Three bills in the current legislative session appear to be stuck in 
committees and unlikely to pass until next year, if at all; these bills would consolidate regulatory 
agencies,111 legalize Internet payday loans,112 and authorize payday lenders to receive specified 
information regarding would-be borrowers’ payday loan history.113 
 
In short, no significant changes to regulation of the payday lending industry have 
occurred since passage of the California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law in 2002.114 
 
Current Federal Law Related to Payday Lending    
 
 Historically, states have borne the responsibility for regulating payday lenders.  However, 
some federal laws that speak to loans and other consumer transactions, generally, apply to 
payday lending practices and provide some level of uniform protection for consumers.  
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Additionally, the federal government has established a 36% rate cap for a variety of loan 
products — including payday loans — when those products are offered to military service 
members and their dependents.  A brief discussion of these federal law protections follows. 
 
Truth in Lending Act 
 
The federal Truth in Lending Act seeks to ensure that consumers receive accurate 
information about credit products.115  With respect to payday lending, the Truth in Lending Act 
and its implementing regulation, “Reg Z,” require lenders to disclose finance charges and APRs 
to consumers “clearly and conspicuously in writing” at or before the time of the transaction.116  
Likewise, Truth in Lending prohibits lenders from utilizing incorrect or incomplete information 
about the terms of the loan product in order to entice consumers; advertisements must accurately 
describe the loan product available and must make certain disclosures regarding the loan 
terms.117  If a payday lender — or any other lender — fails to meet the technical requirements of 
this law, the consumer may be entitled to money damages, as well as attorney fees and costs.118  
A lender who knowingly misleads consumers by failing to make the required disclosures may 
also be subject to criminal liability.119  A bank financing a loan will be subject to Truth in 
Lending Act liability even if the loan was provided through a third-party agreement.120  The Act 
does not, however, cover state-regulated financial institutions where the state has a parallel 
statute, underscoring the importance of ensuring that states enact laws that are equally or more 
protective of credit consumers’ right to receive accurate and complete information about the loan 
products they obtain.121 
 
Military Lending Act of 2006 
 
The Military Lending Act of 2006 provides specific protections to military personnel in 
credit transactions, including payday loans.122  Specifically, the Act caps the APR of loans 
offered to service members or their dependents after October 1, 2007, at 36%.123  Prior to 
providing the loan, the lender must disclose the APR, the payment obligations, of the borrower, 
and any other information required by the Truth in Lending Act, in writing.124   
 
Community Reinvestment Act 
 
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977 to prevent redlining and to 
encourage financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of their communities, including the 
needs of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.125  Congress has reauthorized and revised 
the Act several times since 1977, and the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency share the responsibility of 
implementing and enforcing the Act.126  The federal agency that regulates a particular bank will 
conduct a Community Reinvestment Act Public Performance Evaluation of that bank on a cycle 
determined by the applicable regulations.127  While only illegal credit practices adversely affect a 
bank’s Community Reinvestment Act rating, payday lending activities that are “questionable” 
(as opposed to strictly illegal) suggest that the bank is not best meeting the credit needs of its 
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community; this may impact the bank’s Public Performance Evaluation, and will be included in 
the bank’s public file.128  
 
Additional Federal Protections for Consumers  
 
Federal laws such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,129 the Federal Trade 
Commission Act,130 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act131 also protect consumers in credit 
transactions, including payday loans.  These laws limit the ways in which a creditor may seek to 
collect on a loan and provide remedies for both consumers and the general public when lenders 
engage in behavior that is deceptive, harassing, or otherwise abusive.  Along the same lines, the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act provides limited protection to consumers obtaining payday loans 
via the Internet or otherwise utilizing electronic funds transfers.132  Finally, federal privacy laws, 
such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, help protect consumers’ personal and financial 
information.133 
 
Federal Agency Regulation of Payday Lending Practices 
 
With the exception of the above-referenced statutes, the federal government has largely 
refrained from regulating payday lending.  However, to the extent that mainstream banks, thrifts, 
credit unions, or other federally chartered financial institutions may become involved in payday 
lending, the federal regulatory bodies that oversee those institutions can exert control over those 
institutions’ payday lending practices.  
 
 Because federal law allows federally and state chartered institutions to “export” favorable 
interest rates to borrowers in states other than the state where they are located, and because states 
cannot effectively regulate federally chartered banks due to federal pre-emption issues, many 
payday lenders used “rent-a-bank” partnerships with mainstream lending institutions to 
circumvent state restrictions on loan amounts and interest rates.134  This practice was especially 
prevalent in the 1990’s.135  However, in 2000, federal regulatory agencies began to tighten 
controls on the extent to which the institutions they oversee can engage in payday lending. 
 
 In 2000, the Federal Reserve published a rule clarifying that Reg Z, the implementing 
regulation of the Truth in Lending Act, applies to payday lenders.136  Soon thereafter, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision issued advisory letters 
regarding the participation of national banks and national and state chartered thrifts in payday 
lending.137  These agencies cautioned institutions against the inherent risks of participating in 
short-term, unsecured, high-interest lending and cautioned banks and thrifts against aligning 
themselves with less reputable payday lenders, who might be engaging in illegal collections 
activities or otherwise abusing consumers.138  Since issuing this guidance, both agencies have 
taken enforcement actions to stop institutions from engaging in abusive payday lending practices 
and deterred numerous others.139 
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Although actions by the two agencies effectively limited the participation by federally 
chartered banks and thrifts in payday lending, state chartered banks remained involved until the 
FDIC revised its guidance in 2005.  The FDIC, which insures both federally chartered and state-
chartered banks, recognized the significant risks that payday lending poses to financial 
institutions.140  The FDIC’s primary concern in issuing this guidance was to guarantee that the 
banks it insures do not engage in unacceptably risky lending practices either directly or through 
third-party affiliates.141  Payday loans are unsecured and often made to individuals who lack the 
financial resources to repay them; though usually small in amount when made, these loans 
represent a very tangible risk for lending institutions.142  As such, the FDIC has noted that 
payday lending threatens, not only the stability of the individual institution that engages in it, but 
also the reputation of the banking industry generally.  Through its guidance, the FDIC was able 
to influence the behavior of both federally chartered banks and state-chartered banks, even 
though it does not regulate state-chartered banks directly.143 
 
As with the subprime mortgage lending industry, mainstream banks have often engaged 
in payday lending through their affiliates; in some instances, payday lending subsidiaries belong 
to the same corporate structure as does the mainstream bank itself. 144  In its 2005 guidance the 
FDIC confirmed that a bank’s board of directors and management are responsible for the bank’s 
payday lending practices, even if those practices are conducted through a third party.145  FDIC 
examiners are instructed to review, not only the arrangements between banks and third-party 
lending agencies, but also the practices of the third parties themselves.146  Examiners include 
these inherently risky loans when evaluating whether banks have sufficient capital to absorb the 
potential losses associated with payday lending.147  Additionally, because payday lending 
practices often raise consumer protection issues and attract the attention of consumer advocates, 
participation in payday lending exposes banks to potential litigation.148  By explicitly considering 
these factors as it evaluates financial institutions for insurance, the FDIC actively discourages 
mainstream banks from participating in payday lending.   
 
 However, as mainstream banks have ceased payday lending activities, credit unions have 
begun to fill that gap, and consumer organizations have petitioned the National Credit Union 
Administration, the federal body that oversees credit unions, follow the lead of FDIC and other 
federal agencies in restricting the ability of credit unions to engage in such practices.149  Credit 
unions have long been a resource for low-income and minority communities to obtain more 
affordable alternatives to payday loans.150  Many credit unions provide small loans with 
reasonable interest rates and payment terms.  However, credit unions have recently become 
involved in payday lending.151  Some credit unions have begun to make payday loans 
themselves, while others operate through affiliated credit union service organizations or other 
third parties.152  Although federal credit unions are subject to an 18% usury cap, meaning they 
cannot charge more than 18% APR, some credit unions have circumvented this limit by referring 
to the costs of the loan as “application fees” or “participation fees.”153  Protective federal 
regulation could help to curb these practices — hopefully without deterring federally chartered 
credit unions from offering more affordable small loans to their customers — and parallel state 
regulation could have the same effect on state-chartered credit unions. 
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Pending Federal Legislation Related to Payday Lending 
 
The Pay Day Loan Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1214, was introduced to Congress by 
Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-Ill.) in February 2009.154  This bill would expand payday 
lenders’ duty to make certain disclosures to consumers beyond what is now required by the Truth 
in Lending Act.155  It would require payday lenders to offer “extended” repayment plans 
involving a minimum of 6 payments spaced at least 13 days apart.156  It would limit fees and 
charges to 15 cents on the dollar and would limit the types of actions the lender can take to 
collect the loan.157  However, while Congressman Gutierrez was instrumental in the passage of 
the Military Lending Act of 2006, and while the purported purpose of the bill is to protect 
consumers, leading consumer advocacy organizations have expressed their strong opposition to 
the bill.158  Consumer advocates point out that the bill would essentially give the federal 
government’s seal of approval to payday lenders’ charging triple-digit interest rates:  290% APR 
for a two-week repayment arrangement or 780% APR for one week.159  Additionally, while the 
bill requires payday lenders to offer extended repayment plans only twice a year, the typical 
payday borrower takes out nine loans per year, making the extended payment plan provisions 
largely ineffective.160  While the bill would not compromise any states’ more protective interest 
rate caps, it would preempt state statutes regarding extended payment plans.161   
 
Two additional bills — The Consumer Lending Education and Reform Act (H.R. 
1846)162 and the Payday Lending Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. 2563)163 — also purport to add 
protections for consumers in payday loan transactions, but these bills would actually offer fewer 
protections than would H.R. 1214, discussed above.  Both would endorse triple-digit interest 
rates, and both have less generous repayment plan provisions than does H.R. 1214.164 
 
As discussed further below, many consumer advocates argue that, short of outlawing 
deferred deposit lending altogether, the only way to prevent predatory payday lending activities 
is to cap the allowable APR at 36% nationwide, just as the Military Lending Act did for military 
personnel.165  A competing Senate Bill, Protecting Consumers from Unreasonable Credit Rates 
Act of 2009, S. 500, better addresses these concerns.166  This bill would cap the allowable APR 
at 36%, as well as clarifying which types of fees and costs are included in that limit.167  Over one 
hundred consumer protection organizations across the country have endorsed this bill.168  
 
The following pending federal bills could also impact payday lending practices if passed: 
 
• Interest Rate Reduction Act (S. 582), which would require an 15% APR cap on all 
forms of credit for banks, state credit unions, and other lenders;169 
• Consumer Credit Fairness Act (S. 257), which would disallow claims in bankruptcy 
court for debts arising from “high cost consumer credit transactions,” including any 
transaction whose APR exceeds 36%;170 
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• Financial Product Safety Commission Act (S. 566), which would create a federal 
Financial Product Safely Commission (FPSC) that would ensure the fairness, safety, 
and sustainability of credit and payment products;171 
• Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act (H.R. 3126), which would create a 
federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency to regulate the provision of consumer 
financial products and services;172 
• Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions Act (S. 786), which would 
establish grants to federally insured depository institutions and other entities to create 
banking options (including payday loan alternatives) for previously unbanked low- 
and moderate-income individuals.173 
 
Recommendations 
 
The following three strategies for addressing the problem of payday lending are discussed 
in greater detail below: 
 
• Policy approach:  adopting legal limits on payday lending at the local, state, and/or 
federal level; 
• Banking access approach:  creating alternative credit and/or banking products that 
are more accessible to payday lending customers or assisting customers in 
transitioning to the mainstream banking or credit industries; and 
• Consumer education approach:  teaching potential payday lending customers how 
to avoid the debt trap of payday lending and how to utilize other alternatives. 
 
Policy Approach 
 
Policy Reform Approaches in California Laws Regarding Payday Lending 
 
In late 2008, the Center for Responsible Lending issued its report, “Springing the Debt 
Trap:  Rate caps are the only proven payday lending reform,” which makes an extremely 
persuasive case for the adoption of 36% interest rate caps for all small loans as the only effective 
solution to the payday lending problem.174  The report sets forth the experience of state-law 
reform efforts, demonstrating that any reforms short of such a cap are ineffective in preventing 
the debt trap.  In states which attempted reforms but did not impose a cap, 90% of payday loans 
still went to consumers who were taking five or more loans per year.175  These ineffective 
reforms of payday lending included: 
 
• Loan renewal bans or “cooling-off” periods; 
• Limits on the number of loans outstanding; 
• Requiring payment plans to be offered; 
• Loan amount caps based on borrower’s income; 
• Database tracking of borrowing; and 
• Limits on payday lending that don’t extend to other loan products.176 
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As discussed in the report, an experience with reinstating a 36% rate cap in North 
Carolina confirmed the beneficial effects of enforcing such an interest rate cap on small loans.177  
North Carolina had previously permitted payday lending by exempting payday lenders from its 
extant 36% interest rate cap; that exemption had a four-year sunset provision so that lawmakers 
could analyze the impact of payday lending before reauthorizing the exemption.178  After seeing 
the documented effects of payday lending on residents, legislators declined to reauthorize the 
exemption.179  From 2002-2006, after the exemption expired, the number of consumer finance 
loans made for $600 or less increased by 37%, demonstrating that the market would develop 
other non-payday lending options to help cash-strapped families.180  As the report describes, in 
place of payday loans, “small loans from consumer finance companies, credit unions, and other 
financial institutions have flourished while charging rates at or below the rate cap.”181 
 
Similarly, after the passage of the Military Lending Act of 2006, the Department of 
Defense found that “affordable loan options to the military increased after the cap and that 
military debt relief societies were able to reduce assistance given to indebted members of the 
military because of the reduction in payday loan usage.”182 
 
A small loan cap of 36% has a long history in the United States; most states adopted a 
small loan cap of 36% in the mid-twentieth century to respond to loan-sharking.183  As of March 
2009, fifteen states and the District of Columbia require payday lenders to comply with an 
annual interest rate cap of 36%.184  As explained in greater detail above, in 2006, Congress 
enacted a similar 36% cap for lending to members of the military and their dependents.   
 
Voters across the country appear to support two-digit rate caps.  The Center for 
Responsible Lending conducted a nationwide telephone survey between March 19 and 22, 2009, 
and found that three quarters of Americans who stated an opinion believe that Congress should 
cap interest rates, while 72% think that the interest rate cap should be no higher than 36% 
annually.185  The survey results are consistent with the outcomes of two ballot measures, in Ohio 
and Arizona, in last November’s election.186  In Ohio, voters confirmed, by 3 to 1, a 28% rate 
cap passed by the state legislature.187  In Arizona, voters rejected, by 3 to 2, a payday lending 
industry-backed ballot measure that would have made 391% interest rates legal.188 
 
The National Consumer Law Center has developed a “Model Deferred Deposit Loan 
Act” for states to adopt.189  This Model Act was introduced in the California Senate by Senator 
Perata as SB 834 in 1999 but failed to pass.190  This Model Act seeks to provide broad 
protections for consumers in a range of deferred deposit loan transactions.191 
 
The Model Act would apply not only to lenders, but also to other individuals or 
organizations that facilitate the making of deferred deposit loans, ensuring that payday lenders do 
not flout the law by enlisting the assistance of out-of-state banks or other financial institutions 
that might be exempt from other payday lending protections.192  The Model Act requires 
licensure and bonding of deferred deposit lenders, in turn creating administrative oversight over 
such businesses.193  The licensing process would include both an inquiry of whether the applicant 
 22
has been convicted of a crime and an opportunity for public hearing and comment.194  As such, 
community members would have a voice in determining whether a deferred deposit lender would 
be located in their neighborhood.   
 
The Model Act would limit the amount, nature, and terms of deferred deposit loans to 
prevent unscrupulous lenders from making loans with usurious or abusive terms.  First, the 
Model Act would require that the term of a loan be at least two weeks for every $50 and would 
cap the total deferred deposit loan amount at $300.195  The Model Act would also require more 
thorough written disclosures of the loan’s terms, as well as the consequences of non-payment, 
than does the federal Truth in Lending Act.196  The Model Act would clarify that each of these 
written disclosures must be made to borrowers in both English and in the language in which the 
loan was negotiated.197 
 
Most significantly, the Model Act would limit the charges to borrowers, including a 36% 
APR cap and a cap on how much the lender can charge for a bounced check.198  The Model Act 
would also prohibit a variety of other practices by lenders, including using the proceeds of one 
deferred deposit loan to pay off another earlier loan, threatening debtors with criminal process 
for failure to repay loans, and engaging in various other unfair or deceptive acts.199 
 
Finally, the Model Act would establish administrative, civil, and criminal remedies for 
violations.  Since lenders would be subject to licensing and administrative oversight, consumers 
would have the right to file licensing complaints, as well as to access information about 
complaints made by other members of the public.200   
 
In addition to the rate cap, the Center for Responsible Lending also recommends that 
states adopt: 
 
• Caps on the number of loans a borrower can receive annually to ensure that payday 
loans are only used occasionally in the short-term; 
• Bans on the holding of a check or bank access as collateral or security for a loan to 
prevent the payday loan taking precedence over all other debts and basic needs; and 
• Increased incentives for small loans and emergency savings.201 
 
With respect to Internet payday lending, the Consumer Federation recommends that 
states strengthen state usury laws and/or small loan rate caps and prohibit loans based on 
electronic access to consumers’ bank accounts.202  Short of an outright ban on such loans, the 
Consumer Federation advises that states should amend small loan and payday loan laws to apply 
to Internet-based loans; prohibit choice-of-law provisions that make the laws of other countries 
or states applicable to loans issued to borrowers within that state; and require state credit 
regulators to investigate the Internet payday loan industry to enforce state credit laws and interest 
rate limits.203 
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Despite concurrence among consumer advocates that a rate cap is the most effective 
legislative remedy for payday lending, efforts to adopt such a rate cap in California have not be 
successful and appear to have stalled.  AB 2845 — a rate cap bill proposed by Assemblyman 
Dave Jones in the 2007-2008 Session — is currently inactive and faced strenuous and well-
funded opposition by the California Financial Services Association.  As a result of the anemic 
response of California legislators to enact meaningful payday lending reform, at least one 
California-based advocacy organization has largely re-directed its limited resources over the past 
year or so to work towards the adoption of local ordinances that would restrict the location or 
proliferation of payday lending outlets — discussed further below.204   
 
Policy Reform Approaches in Federal Law Regarding Payday Lending 
 
Three pending federal bills would create additional protections for consumers in payday 
lending transactions.205  Many of the policy reforms discussed for statewide implementation 
above could be effective on the federal level as well.206  With respect to Internet payday lending, 
the Electronic Fund Transfers Act could be updated to extend consumer protections to credit 
transactions not envisioned when the law was enacted.207  However, passage of any of the 
pending federal bills or any other payday lending reforms is in no way guaranteed, and additional 
advocacy will likely be needed in coming years to ensure nationwide, comprehensive protection 
for consumers in small loan transactions.   
Consumer advocates at the national level believe that there is work to be done to build on 
the surprisingly successful federal legislative effort to pass the Military Lending Act; for 
instance, advocates point out that there has been no comprehensive study — either nationally or 
looking only at bases in a state with no statewide rate cap — to examine the effects of the Act.208  
Such a study could certainly bolster efforts to pass a federal rate cap; however, it does not appear 
that this type of study is currently being undertaken. 
Another important element on the federal scene is the new President’s stated support of a 
federal rate cap.  Barack Obama and Joe Biden have publicly stated that they believe that the 
protection extended to the military by the Military Lending Act must be extended to all 
Americans, “because predatory lending continues to be a major problem for low and middle 
income families alike.”209   
Additionally, opportunities remain for existing federal regulatory bodies, such as the 
National Credit Union Administration, to protect consumers and to discourage the entities they 
oversee from engaging in predatory payday lending practices.  For Internet-based payday 
lending, the Consumer Federation of America recommends that the Federal Trade Commission 
investigate the Internet payday loan industry to enforce federal credit and financial privacy 
laws.210  However, any regulatory action should be taken with an eye toward preserving 
affordable small loans for the consumers who need them, where possible.   
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Possible Changes in Local Laws Regarding Payday Lending 
 
 Local governments also have the power to restrict payday lending through zoning 
ordinances.  In “Controlling the Growth of Payday Lending through Local Ordinances and 
Resolutions:  A Guide for Advocacy Groups and Government Officials,”211 consumer advocates 
suggest the following types of local ordinances designed to reduce or stamp out the presence of 
predatory payday lending within a city’s borders: 
 
• Moratorium during Study Period.  Such a temporary moratorium could be enacted to 
prevent new payday lenders from setting up shop while the local government evaluates 
other, more permanent options.212 
• Permanent Moratorium.  Cities may enact a permanent moratorium.  They can choose 
to grandfather in existing stores or make a plan for phasing those stores out.213 
• Limits on Density and/or Distance.   Cities may limit the number of payday lending 
outlets in a geographic area either based on distance or population density.214 
• Special Zoning. Cities can “limit payday lending outlets to special zoning districts or a 
limited number of existing zoning districts.”215 
• Special Permits.  Cities may require payday lenders to obtain conditional use permits, or 
other special permits.216  Cities should ensure that such permits are subject to a public 
notice and comment period. 
 
Many cities have used one or more of these methods to address predatory payday loan 
practices in their communities.217  In the Bay Area, both San Francisco and Oakland have passed 
ordinances restricting payday lending activities.  Oakland requires a special use permit for check 
cashers and payday lenders and sets minimum distances between such establishments, as well as 
a minimum distance between these businesses and schools, banks, credit unions, churches, 
community centers, and liquor stores.218  San Francisco first enacted a temporary moratorium on 
check cashing and payday lending businesses in 2006 and has since enacted permanent controls, 
including a ban on all new payday lending outlets in certain districts and a requirement that, 
anywhere in the city, a new payday loan outlet may not locate within a quarter mile of an 
existing one (or of another “fringe financial service,” such as a check cashing store).219   
 
The City of Sacramento recently adopted an ordinance limiting the activity of check 
cashers and payday lenders.  Although the ordinance, which became effective April 27, 2009, 
will not close existing stores, it places restrictions on new stores.220  Check cashers and payday 
lenders must now obtain conditional use permits before opening any new stores.221  Additionally, 
these types of business may not open within 1000 feet from a church, school, bank, or credit 
union; nor may they open within 500 feet of a residentially zoned area.222 
 
Sacramento first instituted a moratorium on new payday lending and check cashing stores 
in October 2007 in order to explore strategies for addressing these types of business and the 
problems they cause for the communities where they locate.223  Sacramento currently has 55 
payday lending stores, most of which are located in predominantly African American or Latino 
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neighborhoods.224  The new ordinance ends the moratorium but includes provisions to help 
ensure that payday lenders and check cashers who do locate in Sacramento conform to certain 
requirements, including a “‘good neighbor policy’ and . . . other specifications around lighting, 
signs and security.”225  The City Council passed the ordinance unanimously on March 3, 2009, 
following a long battle between consumer advocates and the payday lending industry.226  A 
broad coalition of local community organizations, including Sacramento ACORN, the 
Sacramento Housing Alliance, Villa San Juan Owners Association, the Interfaith Service Bureau, 
the Sacramento Central Labor Council, along with the California Reinvestment Coalition, 
advocated for the ordinance and were instrumental in its passage.227 
 
 Advocates in other cities — such as Los Angeles, San Diego, Bakersfield, and San Jose 
— that have large numbers of payday loan locations should consider mounting similar efforts.228  
Of course, the payday lending industry is likely to mount political or legal challenges — or both 
— to any proposed zoning ordinance that limits its ability to do business in a given 
community.229  Preparations for these potential challenges should involve an array of community 
groups and strategies.  Politically, advocates can encourage payday borrowers who have suffered 
from predatory practices to testify before their local government body about their experiences; 
advocates should also help mobilize voters to tell their elected officials that they support 
regulation of payday lenders.230  Legal services organizations can also play a role in advising the 
city or county about potential legal challenges, as well as responses to those challenges. 
 
 Local governments can also combat payday lending indirectly by supporting policies that 
decrease the market for payday loans.  Cities can fund financial education programs to help low-
income families learn about their credit options, as well as the consequences of accruing 
consumer debt.  They can also support programs that make food and healthcare more accessible 
to the working poor, including campaigns to educate families about public assistance programs 
such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly Food Stamps) and Medicaid 
(Medi-Cal, in California).  Cities and counties can also provide funding for free or low-cost 
health care to low-income families to help them avoid taking out payday loans to cover medical 
expenses.231  While local governments cannot — and should not — force poor families to pursue 
these alternatives to payday loans, making these options available will help to ensure that 
families do not resort to payday lenders because they have no other choice.  City and county 
governments can pass resolutions supporting state and federal reforms of payday lending laws.232   
 
Banking Access Approach  
  
 Many borrowers take out payday loans because of lack of access to or familiarity with 
mainstream banking products.  In many neighborhoods, payday lending establishments see little 
to no competition from mainstream banks.233  A number of authors have noted the barriers that 
mainstream financial businesses face in reaching lower-income customers, as well as the 
importance of removing those barriers.234  The recommendations below provide a guide for how 
lending institutions could attract would-be payday loan consumers by offering alternative and 
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affordable finance products and tailoring business practices to the needs of low-income 
populations.  
  
 In order to successfully serve low-income and minority communities, lending institutions 
must be accessible and usable to the customers who live in those communities.  Mainstream 
banks should consider the following strategies to attract and maintain currently unbanked 
communities: 
 
• Bilingual bank workers.235  Banks should employ bilingual bankers fluent in the 
languages most spoken within a given community; in communities with a high 
percentage of non-native English speakers, banks should consider hiring additional 
bilingual workers. 
• Specialized customer service training.  Reports show that some payday loan 
consumers opt for a payday loan because they feel welcomed, rather than intimidated, 
by payday lending stores.236   Banks and credit unions should train employees to 
relate with customers in a culturally appropriate way, and to be welcoming and 
conscious of potential fears and concerns that customers may have. 
 
Mainstream lending institutions can also compete with payday lenders by providing 
banking products that better meet the needs of potential borrowers.  They should develop a range 
of alternative finance products, in addition to the traditional finance products. 
 
• Small consumer loans (a.k.a. small dollar loans).237  These loans are around $1,000 
or less, with interest rates capped at 36% or lower, without prepayment penalties.  
These loans should also have an automatic savings component, limited maintenance 
fees and an extended repayment period of up to 36 months.238 
• Credit union installment loans.239  Many credit unions offer unsecured installment 
loans with 18% APR or less.  These loans are generally structured so that the 
principal and interest are repaid in equal installments at fixed intervals (usually once a 
month).  
• Low-cost check-cashing (a.k.a. “ethical” check-cashing).240  Would prohibit 
financial institutions from charging exorbitant fees to cash personal checks, even if 
the customer does not have an account at that bank. 
• No-minimum-balance debit accounts that do not allow overdrafts.241 
 
Many different variations on the basic checking account exist and banks can offer accounts with 
any of the following components: initial deposit requirement, monthly account maintenance 
charge, minimum account balance requirement, overdraft protection, limit on the number of 
withdrawals per month, limits on the number of transactions per month, etc.242  In order to attract 
lower-income customers, banks and credit unions should offer banking products that have 
limited or no fees or charges and that have combined checking and savings components.243 
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 Often, would-be borrowers do not have the credentials (i.e., credit history, property for 
collateral, etc.) necessary to access the finance products available at mainstream banks.  As such, 
many organizations and programs working to pull low-income populations out of the cycle of 
debt have developed tools to prepare low-income people to access traditional finance products.  
The following is a list of recommendations for transitioning low-income people from the 
informal economy to participation in mainstream banking arena, as well as for non-predatory 
alternatives to mainstream banking.   
 
• Lending circles.244  These lending arrangements solve the problem of unmet banking 
needs in low-income communities through the informal economy.  Participants 
contribute an amount of money to the “pool” and then each contributor can borrow 
from it when necessary; over time, each person repays the amount that they 
borrowed. 
• Alternative credit reporting.245  Community organizations should develop ways to 
incorporate non-traditional credit references and scoring for borrowers with little or 
no credit history into credit reports in order to enable creditors to more accurately 
assess a person’s credit history and decide whether to qualify that person for a loan or 
credit card.  Such non-traditional credit could be built through lending circles or other 
non-traditional credit sources. 
• “Starter” Bank Account.  These accounts, often provided through mainstream 
banks, are designed to help account-holders build personal savings and establish a 
credit history in order to be prepared to access more affordable credit sources later.246 
• Financial services pre-paid debit cards.  With these cards, the cardholder 
determines the quantity of money to add or reload onto the card, which can be 
equipped with direct deposit, automatic bill pay and automatic savings features, in 
order to enable the cardholder to easily manage finances.  These types of cards have 
very few restrictions.247 
 
 Both mainstream banks and community groups have already begun to implement some of 
the above strategies.  “Bank on San Francisco,” a program pooling the efforts of local 
government agencies, key non-profits, banks and credit unions, works to connect new, lower-
income customers with banks and mainstream financial products.  Key components of Bank on 
San Francisco’s model include: working with financial institutions to make more “starter” bank 
accounts available; educating consumers—especially low-income people—about finance 
management, the benefits of bank accounts and how to open a starter bank account; and 
discouraging new check cashing and payday lending stores from opening.248 
 
In 2008, the success of Bank on San Francisco led Governor Schwarzenegger to launch 
Bank on California, a program aimed to provide low-income Californians with “starter” bank 
accounts through collaborative relationships with banks, community financial organizations and 
local governments.  Bank on San Jose is a pilot program of the Bank on California initiative.  
Currently, Bank on San Jose is working with seven banking partners and one credit union partner 
on key priorities of the program, such as connecting unbanked people with starter bank accounts 
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and providing “second chance” bank accounts in conjunction with financial education for people 
who have mismanaged accounts in the past.249  Additionally, Bank on San Jose is working with 
financial institution partners to begin a practice of accepting alternative forms of identification 
from customers interested in opening a new bank account.250 
 
 Local community groups have also sought creative ways to build credit in low-income 
and minority neighborhoods.  For example, in 2005, the Mission Asset Fund was created when 
the Levi Strauss & Company donated $1 million for the “economic development” of San 
Francisco’s Mission neighborhood.  In deciding on a strategy for using the funds, a steering 
committee comprised mostly of community leaders first assessed the needs and desires of the 
community through community outreach and interviewing, then developed a mission and 
structure that was tailored to the community’s expressed needs.  The Mission Asset Fund now 
connects Mission neighborhood residents with alternative financial products and provides 
financial education in order to help build wealth and personal assets that make those residents 
more financially secure.251  Currently, Mission Asset Fund is partnering with One California 
Bank to house and track payments into lending circles in order to allow community member 
participants to establish and develop credit ratings.252 
 
Consumer Education Approach 
 
Incentives to mainstream financial business to enter lower-income neighborhoods and to 
offer appropriate products should be made in tandem with efforts to educate consumers “to 
dispel myths and misperceptions” about these business.253  And as many have suggested, 
consumers should be provided with information and tools to make the best financial choices they 
can.254  Presumably, an increased understanding about financial and banking options could help 
would-be payday loan consumers to make a different, perhaps less expensive, choice when faced 
with the question of how to cover an emergency expense. 255   
 
For example, adjusting the amount of income tax withheld from a paycheck temporarily 
could provide additional income for an emergency.  Educating people about the logistics of 
making an income tax change, especially the potential benefits and consequences of that change, 
equips them with one more option to consider when assessing finances.  Increased accessibility 
of information about banking and finance options available to people would likely increase the 
likelihood that they will make good decisions about how to manage their money, including 
whether or not to accept a payday loan.256   
 
The Brookings Institution noted that the need for financial education for lower-income 
consumers comes at a time when numerous entities, such as “banks, employers, public schools, 
community colleges, faith-based groups, community groups, and the military,” are providing 
financial education services.257  An abundance of financial education information designed for 
lower-income families can be found online — Brookings cites to www.beehive.org — and most 
states have recently considered legislation related to financial education.258 
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It should be noted that the effectiveness of financial literacy programs has been 
questioned,259 apparently due to the difficulty in creating a sound methodology for assessing 
them.260  It is also important to recognize that some experts in financial literacy programs believe 
that such programs are of limited value without incentives for participants, which are “as 
important as program content and structure in attracting students and in influencing their 
behavior.”261 
 
However, there is certainly support for the thesis that financial education is beneficial.262  
Brookings recommends that community leaders can improve the availability and quality of 
financial education to help lower-income families avoid “unscrupulous business that charge 
higher-than-necessary prices” by: 
 
• Finding and analyzing the gaps, both in delivery and quality, in consumer financial 
education delivery in specified jurisdictions; 
• Researching and publicizing the best practices in consumer financial education that 
will best fill those gaps; and 
• Ascertaining a methodology for setting outcome goals to measure the impact of 
financial education efforts, both in general financial education programs and in those 
that are targeted towards a particular consumer purchase.263 
 
Another Brookings author agreed that “well-evaluated demonstration programs would 
greatly advance our knowledge of best practices around financial education.”264  Locally, adding 
the strategies described above — including a research component and/or an outcome-
measurement element — to existing Bank on San Jose efforts, described above, would be useful 
and advisable.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Payday lenders have capitalized on low-income communities’ demand for small-dollar 
credit products that respond to emergency needs or day-to-day income shortfalls.  Recent years 
have seen a marked increase in the amount of information available about payday lending 
patterns, as well as the ways in which the payday lending industry strips wealth from families 
and communities by creating a cycle of escalating debt.   
 
            Although information about the effectiveness of various strategies to combat predatory 
payday lending practices is less plentiful, a multi-faceted approach seems warranted.  Efforts 
should continue to develop policies at the federal, state, and local level to impose rate caps or 
other controls to protect consumers.  However, given the challenges of mounting these policy 
efforts against strong and well-funded industry opposition, these policies should be 
complimented by on-the-ground efforts to create more affordable credit products that meet the 
same needs as payday loans.  Since the need of low-income families for readily available small 
loans is not likely to abate, creating and sustaining non-predatory alternatives to payday lending 
— whether from mainstream banks or from less “traditional” sources like lending circles — is 
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imperative.  Further, education and organizing efforts can help empower members of low-
income and minority communities to make informed financial decisions, to build wealth in their 
neighborhoods, and to participate in policymaking.  
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Appendix: Legislative Efforts to Reform Payday Lending in California, 2003-2009 
2003-2004 Legislative Session 
 
• AB 2156 (Reyes):  Requires the Commissioner of Corporations’ report regarding the 
implementation of the California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law to include 
specified information on the advertising practices of payday lenders and 
recommendations regarding additional regulation of those practices.265 
 
2005-2006 Legislative Session 
 
• AB 207 (Dymally):  Would have:  (1) prohibited fees on payday loans from 
exceeding an effective annual rate of 10%; (2) required that a post-dated check 
written in exchange for a payday loan be made out to the licensed payday lender; and 
(3) rendered void any check held by the lender for longer than 31 days.266 
 
• AB 1965 (Lieu):  Would have (1) authorized service members and reservists, and 
their spouses, to defer payments on payday loans; (2) prohibited payday lenders from 
garnishing wages or contacting military superiors for collection on a payday loan; and 
(3) required payday lenders to honor repayment agreements made through 
negotiation.267 
 
2007-2008 Legislative Session 
 
• AB 7 (Lieu):  Requires payday lenders to comply with the federal law relating to 
terms of consumer credit extended to armed services members and dependents of 
armed services members as required by the Military Lending Act.268 
 
• AB 634 (Calderon):  Redefines “deferred deposition transaction” to exempt auto 
dealers from coverage when they accept checks as deposits.269 
 
• AB 1534 (Nunez):  Would have required an additional report to be provided to the 
Governor and the Legislature by December 1, 2008.  The report would have included 
specified information on payday loan consumers and the advertising practices of 
payday lenders.270 
 
• AB 2845 (Jones):  Would 1) prohibit the interest on a payday loan from exceeding an 
annual percentage rate of 36%; 2) require the informational notice and written 
agreement for a payday loan to include a notification of the interest rate limit; and, 3) 
prohibit a payday lender from acting to evade these requirements.271 
 
 
 
 32
2009-2010 Legislative Session 
 
• AB 33 (Nava):  Would consolidate portions of three existing state departments to 
create a single operations and licensing framework that would cover licensing and 
regulation of finance lenders, among other entities.272   
 
• AB 377 (Mendoza):  Would make amendments to the California Deferred Deposit 
Transaction Law related to advertising regulations for licensed payday lenders.273  
This bill would also legalize Internet payday loans made to Californians and would 
offer Californians who borrow Internet payday loans only one repayment plan option, 
forcing them to pay additional finance fees as a result.   
 
• AB 545 (Salas):  Would authorize the Commissioner of Corporations to develop and 
implement a system that would enable a payday lender to receive specified 
information regarding a consumer’s history with payday loans.274 
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